The Rise and Decline of Afrikaner Ethnicism in the Twentieth Century*

Paul Bullen (1990)

[revision of the 20th century section of The Development of Afrikaner Solidarity, 1652-1986]

This article is historical or cultural-scientific in Max Weber’s sense of those terms. It is a study of a unique set of concrete events, in this case, the rise and decline since the Boer War of ethnicity as a basis for political mobilization among the Afrikaners. Yet it uses (rather than directly assesses the validity of) general concepts produced in such "natural" sciences as sociology and psychology. I assume here a view of the human being as one capable of both material and ideal motives and both rational and irrational acts, who responds to both Apollonian and Dionysian impulses, and who both values his individuality and has a desire to belong to something bigger than himself, such as a group or a cause. I employ the concept of group membership (by contrast with purely individual existence) in which membership can be both gemeinschaftlich and gesellschaftlich in nature, that is to say, it can be motivated by psychologically rooted social needs as well as by purely prudential ones. I portray Afrikaner ethnic ties as having been deeply felt for many people, but also as having varied in their significance according to historical-social context. I use the concept of an in-group/out-group relationship in accounting for the way ethnic membership has factored in South African politics. I observe the way group affiliation has been affected when it had to compete with other groups which Afrikaners could (and often did) identify with or benefit from. In addition to the in-group/out-group dualism I introduce the more complicated dynamic of triadic relations–-between the Afrikaners, the Africans, and the Anglos. The presence of three major groups influenced South African history fundamentally. South African history, as is well known, cannot be seen as simply a conflict between white and black. It is the existence of a white-white conflict that makes it possible for my story to be primarily an ethnic rather than a racial one. Finally, I use the quasi-materialist hypothesis of an elective affinity between socio-economic status and attitudes toward self and others. The transformation of the Afrikaner from a subsistence farmer to an urban worker, and then again to a confident professional has had a profound impact on his attitudes concerning blacks, the English, and, most importantly for this article, his own ethnic group.

The period of history that began with the British take-over of the Cape colony in 1806 came to an end in 1961, after which time Afrikaner ethnicism1 declined and the black-white relationship became the Afrikaner’s main intergroup tension again. One dialectic (if I may use that word) of South African history involves an initial white/black in-group/out-group relationship which is complicated after a century and a half by the entry of a third party (the English), producing a triadic interaction lasting another century and a half and ending with a more exacerbated black-white in-group/out-group relationship (over the last third of a century). In the nineteenth century Afrikaners saw the English as siding with the Africans. British justice did even the balance in the power relation between Boer and black; and the limited enfranchisement of blacks was in part motivated by a desire to offset Boer numbers. By the end of the second period a norm had been established discouraging English-black alliances against the Afrikaners. A new chapter of South African history will be written when the blacks for the first time to become the dominant group. From a black perspective the period from 1652 to the year 2002, say, could be seen as one long intermediary period.2

In the century and a half that preceded the advent of the British (1652-1795/1806), the main authority in South Africa was the Dutch East India Company. The Dutch, French, and German setters after a time came to identify with the soil of Africa rather than that of Europe. Some felt a commonality in resistance to the Company’s "exploitation," but their lifestyles were individualistic and they cooperated only at times of threat to life and property. Black-white conflict and racist notions developed out of the experience of slave-owning and were intensified on the eastern frontier by a series of "Kaffir Wars" which began in 1779 (and spanned a century). The whites contrasted themselves as European "Christians" with native African "savages" and became an entrenched status group with corresponding status expectations.3

In the nineteenth century the settlers had to respond to British attempts at control. Established Boer racial relations were disrupted by the British legal officials’ notions of impartial justice, British missionaries’ universalistic moral standards, and the abolition of slavery (1834). Tension with the new regime produced among many of the prior settlers a sense of apartness which was ethnic and not just racial. Now what set the Afrikaner apart was not the color of his skin or his European roots. Language was a distinguishing feature; but it pointed to a perceived more fundamental commonality. For some this was shared blood; for others it was a common divine destiny; for many it was a combination of the two. Many of the Dutch-speaking farmers responded by escaping to the north (the Great Trek, 1836-45). There the individualistic settlers established weak states, leaving Afrikaners divided among two republics (Orange Free State and South African Republic [Transvaal]) and two British colonies (Cape of Good Hope and Natal).4

In the twentieth century--the focal period of this article--all Afrikaners found themselves under a common polity--but one shared with the English; and within a common economy--but one shared with blacks and controlled by the English. The weakness of the nineteenth century republics allowed the Boers to be subjugated by the British and forced them to take power more seriously. In reaction to the British imperialism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries there arose among the Afrikaners a minority of self-conscious ethnicists who advocated volk solidarity as well as a majority potentially mobilizable along ethnic lines. Despite being devastatingly defeated in war, Afrikaners in the twentieth century would come to experience themselves as a people which "belongs together" and as a sovereign power.5 The years 1938 to 1966 were the heyday of political mobilization on the basis of an exclusivistic notion of ethnicity, especially from 1948 (when the "purified" National Party acceded to power) to 1961 (when South Africa cut its political ties with Britain). Whereas the years before 1961 saw ethnicism ascending, the years since have seen it on the decline. Ethnicists are today again only a substantial minority of Afrikaners, as they were in the early years of the century; but now the conditions for ethnicist hegemony among Afrikaners, not to mention in the country as a whole, are gone forever.

The Second Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) unified Afrikaners emotionally and led (through the creation of the Union of South Africa in 1910) to their being assembled within one political-geographical unit for the first time since before the Great Trek. Interestingly, since the political unification of the country eight years after the Boer War, South Africa has had only Afrikaner heads of government. Each of these men has been an ethnicist to some extent, and those of the first half of the century were all heroes of the war against the British. Even Jan Smuts, later called "handyman of the Empire" by his opponents, was responsible for the publication in 1899 of the famous piece of Afrikaner ethnicist historiography, "A Century of Wrong." Despite the greater unity there did develop a rift between those who were more and those who were less exclusivistic in their commitment to the volk. With the benefit of hindsight one could say that there were three positions among the Afrikaners. The internationalists believed that membership in the British Empire (and later the Commonwealth) was to some extent a good thing for South Africa and for Afrikaners. The nationalists, in contrast, wanted South African sovereignty vis-à-vis the British, sought the unity of all whites who "put South Africa first," and promoted Afrikaner equality within the larger nation. The ethnicists went further; rejecting the Empire altogether, they saw South African Englishmen as competitors and oppressors, and sought to exalt Afrikaner uniqueness, unite the volk, and achieve its hegemony in South Africa. These were not three clearly identifiable groups, especially in the beginning; only with time did people’s locations on the implied spectrum become clear. Internationalists came to power in 1910; nationalists in 1924; and ethnicists in 1948. (By the 1970s the party of ethnicism had become neo-nationalist). The middle group (nationalists) allied itself with different ends of the political spectrum at different times: from 1914 to 1933 with the ethnicists (this period included a coalition with the English-dominated Labour Party from 1924-29); from 1933 to 1939 with the internationalists. (The internationalists were at the helm again from 1939 to 1948.) In the twentieth century there has been a secular drift toward an increasingly intransigent and systematic Afrikaner ethnicism and racial segregation which only came to an end with the assassination of prime minister Hendrik Verwoerd in 1966. The backing away from ethnicism and racialism has been strengthened in stages under John Vorster (1966-78), P. W. Botha (1978-89), and F. W. de Klerk (1989-).6

Initially all tendencies worked together within the South African Party under Louis Botha. Although Botha, leader of Het Volk (The People) party in the Transvaal before Union, was very popular with Afrikaners, some of the Orange Free State bittereinders (those who advocated fighting the English in the Boer War to the bitter end) remembered that he had recommended surrender to the British in 1901 (a not unreasonable recommendation). To some Botha was too conciliatory toward the former enemy. He claimed, for example, that he wanted to "create from all present elements a nationality; whoever [among the whites] had chosen South Africa as a home should regard themselves as children of one family and be known as South Africans." Botha’s ally Jan Smuts had an even more cosmopolitan vision supported by a philosophy of holism: "In the Empire the Freedom of the parts is making for the salvation of the whole."7

The latent divergences of viewpoint among Afrikaners became exposed with the outbreak of World War One. The Botha government, wanting to be on good terms with its British suzerains, immediately entered the war on the side of England. While many non-political Afrikaners accepted this, others with a more sharp-edged nationalist or ethnicist consciousness felt that participation in the war proved the effective domination of British interests. Furthermore, the Germans had long been supportive of the Boers. For these reasons, in 1914 many Afrikaners participated in an armed rebellion against the government which culminated in a 3-month shoot-out between 10,000 rebels and 30,000 government troops. What Dunbar Moodie calls the last event of Afrikaner sacred history took place when Jopie Fourie was executed between Dingaan’s Day and Christmas Day, 1914 for his participation in the rebellion. This official killing of a Boer War hero took place upon the final confirmation, it so happened, of the then-Minister of Defence, Jan Smuts. Government handling of the rebellion sharpened the distinction between the internationalists and those to their ‘right,’ and helped transfer Afrikaner allegiance to the recently formed National Party.8

Reacting to what he considered the pro-British policies of the South African Party, General James Barry M. Hertzog, a nationalist (as things turned out), had resigned his cabinet post in the Botha government in 1913 and formed the Nasionale party (National Party, NP) in the following year in the Orange Free State, leading both nationalists and ethnicists. In 1915 a branch of the National Party was established in Cape Province with the former Dutch Reformed minister D. F. Malan as the chairman. The national-level National Party that emerged was a confederation of four self-governing provincial parties, which nonetheless could agree on three general goals: (1) political independence (from the British Empire) (2) linguistic equality (for Afrikaans vis-à-vis English); and (3) economic nationalism (protectionism). Whereas the South African Party, in power from 1910 to 1924 (under Botha till 1919, then under Smuts), de-emphasized the differences between Afrikaners and Englishmen, the National Party of Hertzog, in power from 1924 to 1934, emphasized those differences while at the same time advocating a broad South African nationalism in which both kinds of "Afrikaners"--Afrikaans- and English-speaking--would be equal, although separate in education.9

Politicians must appeal to the material and ideal needs (wealth, comfort, security, pride, and "meaning") of their constituents. The conditions which the average Afrikaans voter experienced and to which politicians had to respond were the poverty and the humiliation caused by defeat in war, as well as second-class status in post-war society. Afrikaners had, then, two intertwined needs: to be saved from the material pain of poverty and to be saved from the depressed state of their world order caused by dominance of the English. To these needs the secular salvation religion (to use Max Weber’s term) of the ethnicists and nationalists offered itself as a means of satisfaction. Let us consider the economic and cultural situations following the war as well as the ways in which politicians and intellectuals responded to them.

War destruction combined with pre-existing economic problems associated with the final closing of the South African frontier and the Dutch-Roman inheritance laws (requiring the equal division among all sons of inherited property) left many Boers landless. In addition to all this, South Africa suffered five years of drought from 1903 to 1908. Thousands of small land-owners, unable to support themselves, were forced to leave their land. Some became bywoners (tenant farmers), some even working for blacks; but increasingly the drift was towards the cities in search of work. Urbanization was also encouraged by a population boom among the Afrikaners following the war. The limited opportunities required the increasing surplus population to leave their homes in search of employment. At the beginning of the Boer War only one Afrikaner in ten lived in a city. One year after Union one out of four did; by 1936 one half did (by the mid-1970s, it was only one Afrikaner in ten that still lived in the countryside). In the cities the Afrikaners met the already established English from an inferior position, as well as Africans, who were also flocking to the cities in search of livelihood. Most urban Afrikaners either had low-paying jobs or were unemployed.10

Before the success of ethnic politicians among the lower classes, there was cause to expect Afrikaner urban workers to feel more solidarity with other workers than with affluent members of the same volk. "Ethnic entrepreneurs . . . . had to invest hard ideological labour to persuade the lower class–-workers and poor farmers–-and also those of more affluent classes to see their political destiny in common Afrikaner terms." They had to compete with others who were trying to unite all workers, even across racial divisions. One National Party leader described class consciousness as "the fearful alternative to a return of poor Afrikaners to the true Afrikaner fold." Given the pervasive Afrikaner "poor white" problem and the English and foreign ownership of capital, it is not surprising that Hertzog’s National Party had anti-capitalist, socialist leanings and formed a "Pact" with the Labour Party in 1924. In the 1930s Afrikaner leadership took pains to ensure that class did not threaten ethnicity.11

Because white workers demanded much higher pay than what their employers were giving blacks (i.e., much higher than the market rate), the job color bar (the reserving of certain jobs, or a certain percentage of certain jobs, for whites) was very expensive for the owners. In the early 1920s the mining industry tried to increase the percentage of black workers and to ease blacks into more skilled positions. White unions correctly saw this as a threat to member livelihood and status and responded in 1922 with a workers’ insurrection. Forty thousand workers went on strike, with the Communist Party of South Africa’s participating under the slogan "Workers of South Africa Unite and Fight for a White South Africa!" After much loss of life, the mine-owners and the government crushed the workers. But from then on owners were reluctant to challenge the color bar and in the next election the incumbent South African Party of Smuts (which had supported the capitalists) lost to a National-Labour coalition headed by Hertzog (which had supported the workers). Not only did Afrikaner workers not ally themselves with black workers (who undercut them), but their affiliation with the English labor unions and the Labour Party diminished as they came to perceive them as serving British interests.12

Afrikaners were worried not only about their economic situation but also about threats to their cultural existence. The post-war policy of Lord Alfred Milner, High Commissioner for South Africa from 1897 to 1905, was to "break the back of the great Afrikaner nation" by requiring education in English, actively discouraging Dutch, and encouraging British immigration. Milner’s attempts at anglicization parallel those of Lord Charles Somerset, Governor of the Cape Colony, in the 1820s, a background cause of the Great Trek. The Boers reacted at that time by educating their children at home. Likewise, partially in reaction to Milner’s assault on the Dutch language, a movement arose after the Boer War to promote Afrikaans. This movement attempted to enforce the official policy of the linguistic equality of English and Dutch adopted at Union, while at the same time attempting to substitute the use of Afrikaans for Dutch. It was in the years following the Boer War that the first works of Afrikaans poetry and prose were published. The favorable reception of these works gave the formerly scorned dialect a new dignity. In 1909 the South African Academy for Arts and Sciences, which was committed to using Afrikaans, was established. Schools adopted the language in 1914, as did the churches in 1916. From donations, two hundred Afrikaans medium "Christian National" schools were established in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. Afrikaans finally replaced Dutch as an official language in 1925.13

Beyond just the issue of language, Afrikaner ethnicists were concerned to ensure the survival of their culture in the new circumstances. In 1927 and 1928 South Africa received a new national flag and national anthem, replacing the Red Ensign with Union coat of arms and "God Save the King." These changes were sought as symbolic of independence from the Empire.14

During the 1920s, ethnic cultural activities were often initiated and coordinated by the Afrikaner Broederbond (AB, Afrikaner Brotherhood), founded near Johannesburg in 1918 by men who supported the NP but believed that party-politics was insufficient to achieve ethnicist ends. The group turned secret in 1921 and became a serious cultural and political force after 1927, the year in which cells were first established outside the Transvaal (in the Orange Free State). The AB spread to Natal in 1929 and to the Cape in 1931. Cells were established in Rhodesia in 1939 and in South West Africa (Namibia) and Zambia in 1949 (the latter was dissolved in 1965/66). In 1979 there were 11 cells in South West Africa and 5 in Rhodesia. The above-ground AB umbrella front group, Federasie van Afrikaanse Kulturverenigings (FAK, Federation of Afrikaans Cultural Associations), formed in 1929, took over responsibility for the AB’s cultural activities, freeing the AB to focus elsewhere. Whereas it had been almost completely concerned with cultural matters for most of the 1920s, the AB became active in politics in the 1930s. After 1934 it was the main organizer of the "purified" National Party in the Transvaal and of attempts to increase Afrikaner ownership of capital. The AB’s influential membership allowed private discussion and debate over priorities, strategy, and ideology, as well as the coordination or partial manipulation of the various Afrikaner cultural and political organizations. The AB was also behind many (300 by 1937) non-secret cultural organizations coordinated by the FAK, such as church councils, youth groups, charities, scientific and educational groups, women’s groups, commerce institutes, and first-aid societies. The AB counts among its many feats the organizing of the 1938 Voortrekker Centenary, the propagating of the world view of the purified Nationals, and a drive to increase Afrikaner capital ownership ("the economic movement") in cooperation with the Cape capitalists. In 1934 it formed the People’s Bank (Volkskas), now one of the largest banks in South Africa. The AB helped unify and concentrate ethnicist forces, providing a centralized forum for ethnicists in diverse institutions, such as the Dutch Reformed Church, the NP, the schools, and the unions.15

Although the foundations for ethnicism were being laid during these years, among the people in general "the period from the formation of the Union until 1928 was a low one indeed for an exclusively Afrikaner ethnic consciousness." It was in the next year (1929) that the National Party was first elected on its own (with about 80% Afrikaner support) and the ethnicist faction began to make headway. But, for the 1933 elections Hertzog’s National Party formed a coalition with Jan Smuts’s South African Party. This coalition won 136 out of the 150 seats in the Parliament and in 1934 formally became one party ("Fusion") under Hertzog’s leadership, adopting the name United South African National Party (shortened in practice to United Party). The reasons for Hertzog’s newfound willingness to cooperate with Smuts were political necessity and a belief that most of the nationalist and ethnicist goals of the NP had already been achieved. Hertzog believed that the two languages had achieved equality and that as of the Balfour Declaration (1926), the receiving of dominion status with the Statute of Westminster (1931), and the Status of the Union Act (1934), South Africa was a fully sovereign nation. (This latter belief caused Hertzog to drop the NP’s commitment to republicanism.) And economic nationalism, the third goal of the NP, had the support of Smuts.16

Fusion provoked a split among the NP members, with especially Cape party members under Daniel François Malan refusing to participate. Malan and other ethnicist opponents of Fusion formed the Gesuiwerde Nasionale party (Purified National Party, GNP) in 1934. Until that year General Hertzog had been popularly perceived as the anointed promoter of Afrikaner interests. "From the outset the party was identified with the Afrikaner nation and much of its success in later years must be ascribed to its skill in persuading Afrikaners, and particularly non-Nationalist Afrikaners, that ‘die party is die volk en die volk is die party.’" With Fusion, however, "the ability of the NP to present itself as the personification of national [ethnic] will and interest, and to unite both class power and state power in itself, had been mortally undermined." The years from 1934 saw a continual decline of Afrikaner support for the United Party and corresponding rise in support for the purified Nationals. In the general elections, the parties received the following percentages of the Afrikaner vote:

    1938 UP: 40% NP: 60%
    1943 UP: 32% NP: 68%
    1948 UP: 17% NP/AP: 83%

This transfer of votes was helped by a moderation of the policies and image of the purified National Party, the emotional commemorative events of 1938, and the manner of South Africa’s entry into World War Two.17

The ethnicists, who now had their own political vehicle in the purified National Party, received a boost from the celebrations of the centennial of the Great Trek. The Great Trek, which began in the mid-1830s, was "the central theme of the Afrikaner nationalist [ethnicist] mythology that came to maturity in the first half of the twentieth century." In the mid-1930s stories of the Trek were relived in the press and in 1938 celebrations were held in honor of the hundredth anniversary of the Blood River battle victory, the vow (by Andries Pretorius and the other members of his party to build a memorial church and honor the anniversary of God’s intervention if God should grant them victory in their battle with the Zulus) that preceded it, and the Great Trek in general. The celebration centered on the Oxwagen Trek (Ossewatrek)–-nine oxwagons, each named after a different voortrekker (forward traveler, Great Trek participant) hero, traversing South Africa from different starting points, including as far away as Cape Town, and retracing the steps of the trekboers (traveling farmers, 18th century eastern Cape pioneers) and the voortrekkers. As they passed through the country the wagons were greeted joyously by Afrikaners.

    Men grew beards and women donned Voortrekker dress; street after street in hamlet after hamlet was renamed after one or another Trek hero; babies were baptized in the shade of the wagons–-one was christened "Eufeesia" (best translated "Centennalia")–-and young couples were married in full trekker regalia on the village green before the wagons. With tearful eyes old men and women climbed onto the wagons--"Lord, now lettest thou thy servant depart in peace," said one old man--and the younger ones jostled with one another in their efforts to rub grease from the wagon-axles onto their handkerchiefs. Monuments were raised up and the wagons were pulled through freshly laid concrete so that the imprint of their tracks could be preserved forever.

The Oxwagon Trek culminated in ceremonies on the 100th anniversary of the Battle of Blood River (16 Dec.) near Pretoria and near Pietermaritzburg (at the original site of the battle). At Monument Hill (near Pretoria) over one hundred thousand people–one-tenth of all Afrikaners–-gathered for three days of celebration, including a spectacularly orchestrated show of young "Voortrekkers" (Afrikaner equivalent of the Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts, named after the original voortrekkers) with flaming torches. The celebration ended with the laying of the foundation stone of the Voortrekker Monument.18

The Ossewatrek helped the purified Nationals because its anti-British tendencies made it impolitic for government representatives (such as Hertzog) to take part. Malan and other purified Nationals and Broederbond members, on the other hand, not having these limitations, participated extensively. The four months of the Ossewatrek marked the highpoint of mass enthusiasm in the history of Afrikaner ethnic consciousness. Even the Marxian scholar Dan O’Meara states that "the Eeufees [centenary] did largely succeed in mobilizing Afrikaans-speakers in terms of a cultural and ethnically exclusive vision. It united Afrikaners as Afrikaners, transcending the bitter divisions between the United Party and the Gesuiwerde Nasionale Party." According to Moodie,

    Certainly, by 1938, the ordinary Afrikaner had made the main themes of the civil religion part of his own emotional identity. Most Afrikaners believed that they belonged to an elect People, most believed that at some time in the future, and sooner rather than later, God would give them another republic, but that this would come only through patience and faith. Indeed, for most of them, their identity as Afrikaners was crucial to their personal integration, overriding their loyalty to the wider South African state.

According to Hermann Giliomee, this self-understanding was actually achieved by a majority of Afrikaners only after the failure of Hertzog’s two-streams vision with the onset of World War Two and the end of Fusion in late 1939.19 In any case, the general trend of the period is agreed upon, the dispute being over how far things had progressed in the one or two years before 1940.

The Voortrekker Centenary also helped overcome the class divisions which threatened the unity of the volk and its attainment of power. The poor white problem was addressed during the Centenary by the purified Nationals. Invoking Afrikaner civil religion images, the move to the cities was described as the Second Trek in which the Afrikaner is engaged in a struggle against English domination. The urban labor market was described as a new Blood River in which Afrikaners are once again outnumbered by Africans. The first Ekonomiese Volkskongres (People’s Congress on the Economy: a 1939 national conference of Afrikaner political leaders and intellectuals on how to solve Afrikaner economic problems), the Reddingsdaadfond (salvation deed fund: money collected during the Ossewatrek to aid the Afrikaner poor), the Reddingsdaadbond (salvation deed league: an organization for aiding Afrikaner entry into the modern urban economy), and the subsequent development of a volkskapitalisme (people’s capitalism: an attempt to reconcile disinterested economic forces and ethnic needs) helped to solve the problem of the relative economic weakness of Afrikaners vis-à-vis the English.20

The diffuse feeling of ethnic oneness magnified by the centenary, important though it was in strengthening ethnic consciousness, did not clarify which of the contending political organizations was the supreme embodiment of the volksgeist. In fact, the prevalent sentiment was a cathartic emotional unity which transcended political animosities. But ultimately the pursuit of volkish objectives would require making decisions on whom to support. And the one organization explicitly set up (Feb. 1939) to keep the spirit of the Ossewatrek alive, the Ossewabrandwag (Oxwagon Sentinels), within a short time came into conflict with the National Party of D. F. Malan.21

Just as the nationalists had been helped by the events surrounding South Africa’s entry into the First World War, the ethnicists were helped by the manner in which South Africa entered the Second. When England declared war on Germany, Afrikaner ethnicists and nationalists were concerned to see how independent South Africa really was. When the South African cabinet met on 2 September 1939 (the day after Hitler invaded Poland), six members including Hertzog wanted the country to remain neutral while seven including Smuts wanted war against Germany. Two days later, when the parliament voted 80-67 (in the face of a publicly divided cabinet) to enter the war on the side of England, prime minister Hertzog and many others were outraged. Hertzog was forced to resign as this action was in effect a vote of no-confidence. The governor-general, Sir Patrick Duncan, acting on a rarely-used prerogative of the Crown, refused to authorize the dissolution of the Hertzog government. Instead he requested that another United Party cabinet be formed under the hitherto deputy prime minister Jan Smuts, whose amendment on entering the war won out over Hertzog’s motions. These events "released Afrikaners by the tens of thousands from adherence to the United Party." Jan Christiaan Smuts, seemed even less than (the post-1934) Hertzog to be the unequivocal defender of Afrikanerdom.22

Progress in the attempt, begun in 1939, to form a volksorganisasie (people’s organization: unified front representing ethnic interests) was made in May 1941, when Malan was dubbed the people’s leader (volksleier) by "the triune power of the Afrikaner people"--Reddingsdaadbond, Ossewabrandwag, and National Party--and three prominent NGK clergymen. But, as mentioned, conflict arose between the NP and the Ossewabrandwag, especially when the latter came under the influence of German National Socialism and sought to compete with the NP’s claim to be the primary organizational representative of the volk. Hitler’s racialism was inconsistent with the developing Afrikaner ethnicism. For example, the New Order faction of General Hertzog and Oswald Pirow was racialist but not ethnicist. In the end, the NP won out as the public vanguard organization (as the Broederbond took that role in secret).23

For the 1948 general elections Malan’s party entered an alliance with the small Afrikaner Party (formed by Fusion cabinet minister N. C. Havenga to carry on Hertzogism, while Hertzog himself was carrying on national socialism). To everyone’s surprise, the coalition won 53 percent of the 150 House of Assembly seats (47% by the NP and 6% by the AP). The United Party won 43 percent of the seats and the Labor Party won 4 percent. The coalition actually received only 42 percent of the popular vote, while the United Party received 49 percent. (It was not until 1958 that the NP would receive an actual majority of votes. In the elections of 6 September 1989, the NP dipped slightly below half the white votes again, for the first time in over 30 years.) This outcome was possible because urbanization had produced (conservative and predominantly Afrikaner) rural districts with comparatively few voters, giving those districts more representatives per capita than the city districts.24

Whites constituted 20 percent of the population of the Union of South Africa. Of the whites, Afrikaners then made up 56 percent (now 63). Since the national political franchise was with minor exceptions restricted to whites, if Afrikaners were to unite they could dominate the South African polity. As it turned out, about 80 percent of Afrikaners voted for the NP in 1948.25

There was a variety of motives for Afrikaner unity in support of the National Party.

    Since Union, Afrikaner militants seemed able to rely on a core of about 55 per cent, while the South Africa Party/United Party was able to rely on a core of about 20 per cent--the bloedsappe, Afrikaners who fought with and remained loyal to Botha and Smuts. This left a floating Afrikaans vote of about 25 per cent (much of it in loaded rural seats) which was critical in deciding elections.

Merle Lipton further points out "the importance of the class dimension" and

    the difficulty of attempting to isolate Afrikaner nationalism [ethnicism] as a factor determining political behaviour. It was usually closely inter-related with class interest. If class and ethnicity were in conflict (as in 1943), the Nationalists could not rely on the Afrikaans floating voter; but if ethnicity and economic interests went together (as in 1948), they formed a formidable combination.

Afrikanerdom was a Gemeinschaft with Gesellschaft elements, or vice versa. Not all were fully caught up in the self-transcending ideal of the volk, but neither were all were simply pursuing material benefit.26

The ideology that developed in the Transvaal (in affiliation with the Broederbond) was more rigorous, intellectually thought-out, and exclusivistic than that of Hertzog. Centered on the University of Potchefstroom, and carrying on the intellectual labors of Malan in the Cape earlier in the century, a group of people, who while studying in Holland had imbibed the neo-Calvinism of the Dutch religious and political leader Abraham Kuyper, propagated a theological-philosophical theory of the sanctity of ethnicity as a manifestation of God’s "common grace." God’s individual grace results in a person’s predestination for salvation. God’s common grace refers to his preservation of certain valid institutions in the "fallen world," even though these institutions are populated by sinners and people not predestined for salvation. For the Afrikaner neo-Calvinists, the preeminent expression of common grace was the ethnic group. All "volks," "nations," or "races" were instituted by God for the sake of his glory. Among the Kuyperian intellectuals were L. J. du Plessis (professor and first People’s Bank chairman), J. C. van Rooy (professor, AB chairman, People’s Bank board member), H. G. Stoker, J. D. du Toit ("Toitus," poet), and J. Chris Coetzee, and A. J. H. van der Walt (professor). Potchefstroom academics dominated the Broederbond in the early 1930s.27

After 1938 another ideological strain was ascendant in the AB. In the 1920s and 1930s a number of doctoral students who had been studying in Germany returned with "neo-Fichtean" notions (as Moodie characterizes them) which fit nicely with the self-assertion of the Afrikaner volk and the need to explain the importance of both cultural distinctness from the English and the cultural, social, and political separation of the non-whites. Among these intellectuals were Nicholaas "Nic" Diederichs (Afrikaanse Nasionale Studentebond chairman, Reddingsdaadbond chairman, Broederbond chairman, political philosophy chair), Vorster minister of finance, president of the republic), Piet J. Meyer (Broederbond chairman, FAK official, South African Broadcasting Corporation board of governors chairman), Hendrik F. Verwoerd (sociology professor, newspaper editor, prime minister), Geoff. Cronjé (sociology professor, author of 2 books [1945, 1947] important in the development of apartheid ideology), J. de W. Keyter (sociology professor), Albert Hertzog, son of the prime minister (People’s Bank board member, lawyer, union organizer, Herstigte Nasionale party founder [1969]), T. J. Hugo (political science professor), and Anton Rupert (business tycoon). This more secular ideology would provide the basis for the ideology of apartheid developed by the intellectuals of the Cape Province’s Stellenbosch University-based South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (SABRA), founded in 1949.28

A. James Gregor characterizes the ideology of this second current as Hegelian in structure, although he says there is no evidence that the philosophers drew consciously from Hegel. It rejects classical liberalism with its "negative" notion of freedom. The individual, it is said, can only find self-realization in a community, in particular in his own volk. In his "Nationalism as a World View," Nic Diederichs wrote that, "Nationalism rejects [the liberal] concept of freedom . . . on the grounds that the individual in itself is nothing, but only becomes itself in the nation as the highest community." Although each ethnic group has its own dignity, the intermingling of different groups is destructive to human fulfillment.29

There was some tension between the neo-Fichteans (or neo-Hegelians) and the neo-Calvinists, since the former’s position disregards the principle of the "independent sovereignty of spheres," central to Kuyperianism. For the more secular group the various aspects of ethnic society were properly organized and led by the ethnic state; for the Calvinists, on the other hand, all spheres (e.g., the state, religion, education, the family, science, the arts) should be independent, each relating directly to God. In addition to the Kuyperians and the neo-Fichteans, O’Meara lists a third ideological tendency based on the idea of the volkskerk, advocated by some Dutch Reformed Church (Nederduits Gereformeerde Kerk, NGK) clergymen and others, including D. F. Malan. The National Party produced a synthesis in its "Christian National" education, but splits emerged after the election victory of 1948. The three strains agreed, nonetheless, upon the ideals of (1) ethnic collectivism, including the need to promote ethnic culture; (2) interclass unity, in particular the need to convince workers to identify primarily with their ethnic group; (3) volkskapitalisme, that is, the need to take control of South African business and adapt it to ethnic needs; and (4) republicanism.30

Growing out of the ideologies of Afrikaner ethnicism was an idea important in the 1948 NP election campaign. Originally coined to refer to the need to keep the Afrikaans and English cultures segregated, apartheid (meaning apartness, and pronounced apar-tate, not apar-thide) came to refer primarily to the NP’s policy with regard to white-black relations.31 Apartheid was a plan for a South Africa in which the whites could have their own culture in an overwhelmingly black environment. Although Afrikaners wanted to maintain ethnic integrity in the face of the English, because of their European origins the English were accepted as a developed or civilized people, on a par with the Afrikaners, susceptible though they were to false ideologies such as liberalism. Sharing equal political and other rights with them was thus acceptable. The various African "nations," on the other hand, were viewed as backward and demoralized. They could conceivably attain civilization, and in such an eventuality could participate in self-government. Until then, however, they should be kept separate, under benevolent white guardianship. To the nationalists and ethnicists, as well as many other whites, a laisser faire attitude toward world-wide political trends and domestic labor market trends was tantamount to cultural, political, and economic suicide. In the ideology of apartheid the neo-Fichteans supplied a philosophical rationale for segregation. They claimed that an African trying to live in a white society would suffer alienation from his true self. Separated from his own volk his self-realization as a person would be thwarted.

The ideology of apartheid originated in the Suid-Afrikaanse Bond vir Rassestudie, an offshoot of the liberal South African Institute of Race Relations. "From 1935 the group had already busied itself with the concept of ‘Apartheid’. The word itself had become fairly current among both academic and political intellectuals. In 1943, D. F. Malan had already included the word in his political vocabulary . . . . In 1945, ‘Apartheid’ as a concept, without attention to the minutiae, was declared the official policy of the Herenigde [Nasionale] Party. Two years later, a commission was appointed to work out the details." The Suid-Afrikaanse Bond vir Rassestudie’s "first proposals were quickly echoed in the publications of the Federasie van Calvinistiese Studente Verenigings, and their subsequent development constitutes a complex feedback phenomenon involving SABRA, the Afrikaans churches and cultural institutions, as well as the National party in power." The Bond was a forerunner of the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (SABRA, affiliated with Stellenbosch University in the Cape), formed in 1949 for the purpose of elaborating apartheid policies and their ethical rationales. There were three main ethnicist institutions and propagators of apartheid ideas: the National Party, the Afrikaner Broederbond, and the Dutch Reformed Church, each of which shared a common outlook in the 1940s and 1950s.32

Many of the ideals of the ideologists of racial segregation meshed with the material interests of a large portion of the white population until the late 1960s. In fact, ideological apartheid merely strengthened and made more thorough already existing racial segregation and discrimination and reversed the slight softening of it that had taken place under Smuts. Merle Lipton has analyzed the relationship between apartheid and the major sectors of the South African economy. Apartheid, stipulatively defined by her as a set of practical policies of racial segregation without reference to the specific ideology and policies developed by the ethnicists from the 1930s to the 1960s, progressed apace from well before Union until the late 1960s, with the exception of two periods of slight erosion: 1920-24 and 1939-48. The main economic sector supporters of apartheid have been agricultural capital and unskilled white labor. For much of this century the government has taken their interests quite seriously since most Afrikaners were either commercial farmers, workers, or looking for work; and the rural ridings were overrepresented in Parliament. Mining capital (predominantly English owned) supported restrictions on mobility and family stabilization ("horizontal apartheid") but fought the job color bar ("vertical apartheid"), while manufacturing and commercial capital opposed economic apartheid altogether.33

With control of the state in the hands of the ethnicists from 1948, quasi-totalitarian elements were introduced. Education was used much more consciously than in other Western countries to inculcate in children the ruling party’s world view, and radio (and since its introduction in 1976, television) has been under government control. At the same time there persisted liberal institutions, such as a press, a higher education system, and elections (of restricted franchise) that were all comparatively free. Furthermore, unlike Communism or Italian Fascism, Christian Nationalism saw itself as the ideology of only one segment of the population and loyal adherence was expected only of them.34

Since 1961
Throughout this century most of the bases for Afrikaner resentment against the English have been eliminated one by one as a result of such things as the election of Afrikaner prime ministers, the replacement of flag and anthem, the receiving of dominion status, the 1948 election (as a result of which "the two groups constituting white leadership have in fact changed places"), economic advances, and finally the events of 1961, when the "last shot [was] finally . . . fired in the Boer War" by South Africa severing her political links with Britain. South Africa was declared a republic following a referendum of whites and soon thereafter left the Commonwealth, preempting probable expulsion instigated by hostile Third World members and Canada. India, which also had become a republic but had remained within the Commonwealth, was particularly critical of South Africa’s treatment of its Indian population (located mainly in Natal, originally brought there to work on sugar plantations).35

Between 1948 and 1961 the blacks replaced the English at the center of Afrikaner anxiety. By now "‘[t]he English’ were a composite group, including immigrants from Germany, Russia and other European countries. They all adopted the English language, and many developed an attachment to British institutions and traditions, but lacked the social cohesion of the Afrikaners; indeed it was mainly their dislike and fear of the Afrikaners that held them together." During this time in which the English seemed less and less a problem, the blacks (the other force in the triad) began to be more assertive. This is the period in which the legal basis for the stringent apartheid variant of racial discrimination was established. It was in the year before the republic was established that the Sharpeville massacre took place, on the occasion of a protest against the pass laws and culminating a decade of growing black resistance to the new order. With blacks as the main out-group once again, the whites, both English and Afrikaans, became one "nation" in official rhetoric. In fact, "the whole debate over Anglo-Afrikaner issues up to 1961 assumed that the White minority was sufficiently in control of the majority to be able to quarrel happily on issues of its own choosing. The threat, internal and external, was insufficient to create a White, as distinct from an Afrikaner laager [a circle of wagons in a formation for protection against outside attack]."36

To obviate a new version of the original triadic problem the Boers had had with the English supposedly siding with the blacks (in the nineteenth century) "the Nationalists laid down for the conduct of politics, [a rule] that no party or pressure group should seek Black allies in its fight against Afrikaner nationalism."37 In the altered circumstances the Englishman became a potential ally, rather than the enemy or an ally of the enemy.

The achievement of the goal of a republic caused a shift away from ethnic exclusivism. As the British threat has diminished so has the need for emphasizing Afrikaner "ownness." For example, P. W. Botha’s 1979 "‘Twelve-point programme’ contained no reference to Afrikaners and he urged that people ‘not become so emotional about Afrikaner unity that they lose touch with reality.’"38 But the Afrikaners’ new desire for racial unity was an implicit threat to ethnic unity, because it tended to lower the barrier between the two communities.

As the status situation of many Afrikaners has changed with the ensconcement of the National Party and the economic advances since 1948, there has been a corresponding change in Afrikaner attitudes. According to Weber,

    [Social] strata in firm possession of social honor and power cultivate their group myth [ständische Legende] [such that it develops] in the direction of [including the notion of] an inherent quality–usually of blood–-special to themselves: their (real or alleged) being [Sein] is what nourishes their feeling of dignity. By contrast, socially depressed [gedrückte] or negatively (at least not positively) valued strata nourish their feeling of dignity most easily through the belief in a "mission" specially entrusted to them: it is their duty [Sollen] or their (functional) accomplishment [Leibstung] which guarantees or constitutes for them their own worth, thereby moving the source (of value) beyond themselves to a God-given "task".39

Before the decisive achievement of Afrikaner hegemony and prosperity, these two attitudes corresponded roughly to those of the British rulers and the Afrikaners, respectively. If the British had not come to South Africa, or if they had only ended up as a small powerless minority, the Afrikaner "group myth" and hence its ethnic character, would have been quite different. As the status situation of many Afrikaners changed with the ensconcement of the National Party in 1948 and the economic advances since then there has been a change in Afrikaner attitudes.

In 1948 Afrikaner per capita income was less than half that of the English. Over the four decades since then that gap has been virtually eliminated.40 Afrikaner economic and political successes have produced a large class of educated, urban professionals and entrepreneurs, many of whom have developed vocational consciousnesses at odds with traditional notions of volk loyalty.41 Since the late 1960s Afrikaners have become more moderate. "It is ironic that this newly gained self-confidence inevitably meant that the Afrikaners would change some of their ideals and norms. Believing that the struggle for Afrikaner equality has been successfully concluded, they are not willing to conform to group norms and to pursue traditional goals . . . "42 Significantly, Day of the Vow (December 16) celebrations during the sesquicentennial of the Great Trek (1988) were much more subdued--and divided--than they had been fifty years before.43

Afrikaner relations with blacks, after a period of unprecedented rigidity following the 1948 elections, softened somewhat--only rhetorically during the 1960s under Verwoerd, but progressively in reality in the administrations after his. There have been a number of reasons for this, including class and status changes of the Afrikaners (leading to new economic interests and a new mindset), the logic of separate development, international sanctions, and domestic revolt.44

The general routinization of ethnic charisma has led to a diminished concern for racial as well as ethnic barriers (especially in those areas which do not involve a surrender of ultimate power). For many Afrikaners blacks are no longer an immediate job threat and their sense of status does not rest on keeping blacks in an inferior position. In 1979 Hermann Giliomee wrote that there was a "distinct but not yet decisive shift away from an identity that rests on exclusivity and privilege toward an orientation in which culture, merit, and free association are preferred to race as the basic ordering principle of society . . . . [T]he Afrikaners are at the moment engaged in the painful process of redefining the inner, non-negotiable core of their identity as they prepare to meet these challenges." Most aspects of "petty apartheid" have been eliminated and opinion polls suggest a growing willingness of Afrikaners to countenance greater social equality for blacks. A November 1986 NGK resolution holds that apartheid cannot be justified scripturally. On 10 March 1989 the NGK publicly took the position (although five days later it backtracked at bit) that apartheid is sinful and asked forgiveness for its historical role in giving it a religious justification.45 Finally, F. W. de Klerk, with some Afrikaner support, has unbanned not only the African National Congress and Pan-African Congress, but also the South African Communist Party, and has entered into negotiations with extra-parliamentary opponents including Nelson Mandela and Joe Slovo. The palatability all this was certainly enhanced by the rapid decline of Communism beginning in late 1989.

In the 1960s the apartheid plan took the more specific form of "separate development" or "separate freedoms," entailing total territorial separation and ultimately political independence for each of the African ethnic groups. Each African nation would develop on its own, in its own "homeland".46 For those desiring it, there could also be confederation among the several African nations and the one white nation. But blacks had become an integral part of the economy in "white areas," and the areas allotted to the blacks could not compete with the attractions of Johannesburg or Cape Town. Making separate development work would have required material sacrifices much greater than the whites were willing to make.47 Nonetheless, the logic of the more culturally relativistic separate development version of apartheid discouraged some of the more extreme formulations of racialism.

In any case, fundamental changes were inexorably taking place in the socio-economic structure of the country, regardless of the intentions of individuals. By the late 1960s white unemployment had virtually ended, there was an acute skilled-labor shortage, and many Afrikaners were now themselves urbanized professionals or businessmen. Although political apartheid (the restriction of national-level political rights to whites) has been a greater source of contention because of its perceived connection with political stability and white security (to put the matter mildly), economic and social apartheid came to materially benefit fewer and fewer people--mainly the government bureaucrats that administered apartheid and low-skilled white labor (whom the blacks undercut). This caused a divergence of interests within the National Party, new pressures on the government, and a subsequent weakening of economic and social apartheid in the 1970s and 1980s.48

Domestic political protest has also contributed to making apartheid less attractive to many Afrikaners. According to Herman Giliomee, "From 1700 to the 1950s the proportion of whites to the overall population of South Africa was always sufficient to man all the strategic positions in the political, economic, and administrative system of the country . . . . Between 1910 and 1960 whites constituted 20 percent of the total population, but from that year the white demographic base started to shrink. By 1985 the proportion of whites to the total population had fallen to 15 percent, and it is projected to shrink to 11 percent by 2020. An acute shortage of manpower developed in both the public and private sectors."49 Because, inter alia, of the need for skilled workers, the government has arranged for a substantial increase in the number of educated Africans, which in turn has increased African politicization, a background cause of a number of urban revolts since 1976.50

One more cost of apartheid--to some segments of the white population--was caused by international sanctions.51 Especially with its peopling by an increasing number of newly independent Third World countries since World War II, the United Nations has turned against it. While overcoming their second-class status domestically, Afrikaners found themselves presiding over a regime that was developing pariah status internationally. Something that might have been inconsequential to nineteenth century farmers was disconcerting to an increasingly sophisticated late twentieth century urban Afrikaner population with numerous cultural and economic links to the outside world. While South Africa was slowly moving away from racial segregation and discrimination, the ‘world’ was becoming increasingly preoccupied with these realities. Policies of radical racial separation helped turn the whole world into an outgroup. The hostile stance of the "international community," together with the loss of white rule in neighboring Mozambique (1975), Angola (1975), and Zimbabwe (1980) and United Nation’s demands concerning Namibia (which ultimately became sovereign in 1989-90), gave rise to the South African government’s theory of a "total onslaught" and the corresponding need for a "total strategy."52 The international out-group helped induce an ideological consciousness, with the South Africans, especially Afrikaners, cast as misunderstood defenders of Western, Christian civilization against unfair attacks by demagogic communists and naïve liberals. One effect of international isolation is to induce the white leaders to seek harmonious relations with some domestic blacks, such as Gatsha Mangosuthu Buthelezi, and other African states, such as Mozambique and Malawi. Even Nelson Mandela, while still in jail, was approached respectfully by the government.

The (never fully, but nonetheless impressively) monolithic volk/ party/ church/ secret society conglomerate has ended.53 Afrikaners are now split into a pragmatic mainstream (just under 50 percent) that supports the NP and has rejected the classic ideology of apartheid, a substantial verkrampte (cramped one, conservative) minority (about 40 percent), mainly centered on the Conservative Party, and a smaller but influential group of dissidents to the left of the National Party (about 10 percent), many of whom now support the Democratic Party (and formerly supported the Progressive Federal Party). The Conservative, National, and Democratic parties are currently all led by Afrikaners (as would be expected for the first two of these parties).

In 1969 the opposition of the verkramptes to the idea of one white nation (together with their opposition to racial integration in international sports) was a major cause of their purge from the NP and for their establishing the Herstigte Nasionale party (HNP) under Albert Hertzog.54 Unlike the party of General Hertzog (Albert’s father) founded in 1914 and Malan’s founded in 1934, the HNP did not become the new mainstream. By the early 1980s about one third of the English were voting for the NP and one third of Afrikaners were voting for parties to the right of the NP and 5 percent for parties to its left.55 The NP, for its part, was trying to compensate for losses to the right by appealing to English-speakers. This practical political need reinforced the trend toward less ethnically exclusive oratory and official mythology.56 In the 1981 general elections, one third of Afrikaners voted for the Herstigte Nasionale Party and Connie Mulder’s National Conservative Party (not to be confused with the CP), to the right of the NP (and 5 percent to the PFP). It is estimated that in 1982 these two parties had the support of 40 percent of Afrikaners.57 A more serious right wing split took place in 1982 when cabinet minister and Transvaal party leader Andries Petrus Treurnicht and many other NP members left the party to form the Conservative Party (CP), whose policy positions are roughly what was NP orthodoxy from Malan to Verwoerd.58 In 1987 the CP and HNP received about 43 percent of the Afrikaner vote, the PFP 7 percent, and the NP 50 percent.59 In 1987 the CP, now the main ethnicist-racialist party, became the official opposition, replacing the Progressive Federal Party in that role. The NP is still an ethnic party in that its leadership is completely Afrikaner, but at the end of 1980s close to half the English voted for the NP, while half the Afrikaners did not. The general elections of 6 Sept. 1989 further expanded CP parliamentary power and solidified the liberal left in the form of PFP’s successor, the Democratic Party. F. W. de Klerk’s initiatives are seriously testing the extent of his white, especially Afrikaner, support. It is not clear how far he can go without creating overwhelming demands for new white elections.60

Among the forces making Afrikaner ethnic consciousness salient in the twentieth century before 1961 were the greater accumulated weight of a common history, especially memories of the Boer War (1899-1902) and a "myth" (in a Sorelian sense) surrounding "sacred" events, such as the Great Trek, of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; the unification of the polity (1910); the coordinating role of the Afrikaner Broederbond (since the late 1920s); the success of the ethnicist elite at institutionalizing its ideas in the Broederbond cultural network, the National Party, and the Dutch Reformed Church--all of which had highly overlapping leaderships and a coincidence of perspectives (from the 1930s to the 1960s); the gaining of control of the state, the educational system, and some of the news media by the ethnicists (1948); the development of the whole world into an out-group (since the 1950s); the fact that Afrikaner numbers allowed the possibility of political victory without appealing to English interests (and the faster population growth rate of the Afrikaners by comparison with the English); and the size of the excluded black population (and the faster population growth rate of the blacks, especially since the 1960s).

On the other hand, unity before 1961 was threatened by (in addition to individualism and apathy) internal fighting because of different ideologies, personalities, intra-party factions, material interests, generations, and regions. These sometimes manifested themselves in contending institutions claiming to be the true vehicle of the volk. Moreover, there have been collective affiliations other than ethnicity which have vied for the loyalty of individual Afrikaners, for example, race (unity of whites against the blacks, rather than just a unity of the Afrikaners); class (unity of the poor and uneducated, or the wealthy and educated); profession (norms of academic world or legal profession); nation-state (unity of all South Africans, or at least all whites, loyal to the sovereign state); party (loyalty to the National Party or the South African Party, rather than to all Afrikaners regardless of politics); Empire/Commonwealth (consciousness of South Africa as part of the Commonwealth vs. of South Africa as higher than the Commonwealth; loyalty to the Crown vs. loyalty to the prime minister or party leader); and religion (Christian community rather than ethnic group as the higher value).


*I would like to thank Ralph Austen, Russell Hardin, Edward Shils, and the participants in Russell Hardin’s weekly discussion group for their comments on earlier versions of this article.

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1.I am using this archaic word in a new way. As nationalism is to nation, racialism is to race, and internationalism is to the world, so ethnicism is to ethnicity. It relates to the organizing of one’s world view and political action in terms of the one’s ethnic group, i.e., in terms of those who are generally viewed as a kind of extended family, viewed, that is, as sharing a common culture, tradition, language, and biological ancestry not necessarily coextensive with political-territorial or racial membership. The term is roughly equivalent to "ethnic nationalism". Please note that hereafter references, including those for direct quotations, can usually be found collected in a single footnote at the end of each paragraph.

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2. On triadic relations see Georg Simmel, The Sociology of Georg Simmel, trans., ed., and intro. Kurt H. Wolff (New York: Free Press, 1950), 118-169. On in-groups and out-groups see William Graham Sumner, Folkways and Mores, ed. and intro. Edward Sagarin (New York: Schocken Books, 1979). On English motives in black enfranchisment, see Albie Sachs, Justice in South Africa, (Berkeley and Los Angles: University of California Press, 1973), 113.

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3. On the issue of Boer individualism and independence see Hermann Giliomee, "The Growth of Afrikaner Identity," in Heribert Adam and Herman Giliomee, Ethnic Power Mobilized: Can South Africa Change? (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1979), 97. For causes of the reinforcement of racial identity, see ibid., 86; Hermann Giliomee and Richard Elphick, "The Structure of European Domination at the Cape, 1652-1820," in The Shaping of South African Society, 1652-1820, ed. Hermann Giliomee and Richard Elphick (Cape Town: Longman, 1979), 360. On slavery’s influence on race relations, see Sachs, 19ff.

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4. On the introduction of British legal procedure, see Sachs, chap. 2.

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5. On the definition of ethnicity, see Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, 2 vols., ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1976), 389. On "belonging together" see Weber, Economy and Society, 41, Ferdinand Tönnies, Community and Association (Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft), trans. and suppl. Charles P. Loomis (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1955 [first published in 1887]), 17-28, 223. On the weakness of the Boer states, see Hermann Giliomee, "The Beginnings of Afrikaner Ethnic Consciousness, 1850-1915," in The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa, ed. Leroy Vail (London: James Currey/Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989), 26. On Afrikaner ethnicism’s relationship to nineteenth century British imperialism, see René de Villiers, "Afrikaner Nationalism," in The Oxford History of South Africa, vol. 2: South Africa, 1870-1966, ed. Monica Wilson and Leonard Thompson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 367; F. A. van Jaarsveld, The Awakening of Afrikaner Nationalism, 1868-1881, trans. F. R. Metrowich (Cape Town: Human & Rousseau, 1961), 215.

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6. De Villiers, 367. For the ways in which many of the trends of the first half of the 20th century played out in one small town (Cradock, Cape), see Jeffrey Butler, "Afrikaner Women and the Creation of Ethnicity in a Small South African Town, 1902-1950," in The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa, ed. Vail. On Smuts’s relationship to "A Century of Wrong," see Leonard Thompson, The Political Mythology of Apartheid (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1985), 33, 176. "When did the British Empire disappear? It was present and voting at the end of the First World War, a member in fact of the League of Nations. Winston Churchill used to speak of the Commonwealth and Empire between 1939 and 1945. In the sense in which it was used in the Balfour Declaration the Empire disappeared between 1926 [Balfour Declaration] and 1931 [Statute of Westminster] when the newly autonomous parts became ‘Dominions’, and the still subordinate parts were left with their various dependent technical labels . . . " (Geoffrey Marshall, Constitutional Conventions: The Rules and Forms of Poltical Accountability [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986], 169); Moodie, 285.

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7. Botha quote: Giliomee, "Identity," 105. Smuts quote: Dan O’Meara, Volkskapitalisme: Class, Capital and Ideology in the Development of Afrikaner Nationalism, 1934-1948 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 47. W. A. de Klerk, The Puritans in Africa: A History of Afrikanerdom (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1975, 1976), 93; D. W. Krüger, The Making of a Nation: A History of the Union of South Africa, 1910-1961 (Johannesburg: Macmillan, 1969), 22. By 1901 most land was in British hands. Those who stopped fighting before the official end of the war in 1902 were called hensoppers. Bittereinders continued with a guerrilla war against the British. In this article the term "black" comprises Coloureds and Asians, as well as "Africans." Most Coloureds (descendants of the lighter-skinned San ["Bushmen"] and Khoikhoi ["Hottentots"], mixed together with Malay and African slaves, Xhosa, and whites) speak Afrikaans, are Dutch Reformed, and live in Cape Province; see Study Commission on U.S. Policy, South Africa: Time Running Out (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press/ Foreign Policy Study Foundation, 1986), chap. 2. On Smuts’s holism, see Krüger, 29; Anthony Trowbridge, "Holism--60 Years on," Star: International Airmail Weekly, (Johannesburg) [later references as Weekly Star], 8 Nov. 1986, 15; C. D. Burns, review of Holism and Evolution, by the Rt. Hon. J. C. Smuts, In International Journal of Ethics, 37 (April 1927): 314.

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8. T. Dunbar Moodie, The Rise of Afrikanerdom: Power, Apartheid, and the Afrikaner Civil Religion (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980), 2. "Sacred history" began with British occupation of the Cape in 1806. David Harrison, The White Tribe of Africa: South Africa in Perspective, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1981), 66; O’Meara, 62-64.

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9. O’Meara, 97, 31-33; Giliomee, "Identity," 104; de Villiers, 369-70. On various divisions and differences within the party see Moodie, 282; O’Meara, 104-6; de Villiers, 388-90; Giliomee, "Beginnings," 37, 39; David Welsh, "The Politics of White Supremacy" in Change in Contemporary South Africa, ed. Thompson and Butler, 64ff; Giliomee, "Party and Broederbond," 24-5.

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10. Harrison, 47, 66; O’Meara, 25, 81-82; Hermann Giliomee, "Processes in the Development of the Southern African Frontier" in The Frontier in History: North America and Southern Africa Compared, ed. Howard Lamar and Leonard Thompson (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 118-19; Merle Lipton, Capitalism and Apartheid: South Africa, 1910-1984 (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allenheld, 1985), 389. Whereas the Afrikaners were 88% urbanized by 1974, the English had reached that level by 1936. According to André du Toit, "Africaner nationalism as a political movement essentially is a modern and urban phenomenon" ("Ideological Change, Afrikaner Nationalism, and Pragmatic Racial Domination in South Africa," in Change in Contemporary South Africa, ed. Leonard Thompson and Jeffrey Butler [Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975], 25).

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11. First quote: Giliomee, "Beginnings," 50. Second quote: Moodie, 201. See O’Meara, 65. For the later classes divisions, see Welsh, "White Supremacy," 67. Moodie, 198.

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12. C. W. de Kiewiet, A History of South Africa: Social and Economic (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), 159-170. On the job color bar, see Lipton, 19-20. On the insurrection, see Harrison, 79-82. On the Communist Party slogan, see Edward Roux, Time Longer than Rope: The Black Man’s Struggle for Power in South Africa (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964), 148; Heribert Adam, Modernizing Racial Domination: The Dynamics of South African Politics (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971), 19-20; A. Lerumo, Fifty Fighting Years: The Communist Party of South Africa: 1921-1971 (London: Inkululeko Publications, 1971), 49-52, 121-22; Giliomee, "Identity," 108-9; Lipton, 182, 193; Harrison, 79.

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13. T. R. H. Davenport, South Africa: A Modern History, 2d ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), 150-1; Krüger, 7, 41; Harrison, 51-52, 55; Edward Norman, Christianity in the Southern Hemisphere: The Churches in Latin America and South Africa (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 104; Giliomee, "Identity," p. 103; Moodie, chap. 3. The term Christian National refers to the Dutch Reformed faith ("Christian") and the volk or Nasie ("National"); cf. Sandra Burman, "The Contexts of Childhood in South Africa: An Introduction," in Growing Up in a Divided Society, ed. Sandra Burman and Pamela Reynolds (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1989), 15; Pieter le Roux, "Growing Up an Afrikaner," in ed. Burman and Reynolds, 186-89, 195, 206. On the language issue see Harrison, chap. 4; Moodie, chap. 3; and J. Alton Templin, Ideology on a Frontier: The Theological Foundations of Afrikaner Nationalism, 1652-1910 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1984), 276.

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14. Welsh, "White Supremacy," 51; Thompson, 38.

15. J. H. P. Serfontein, Brotherhood of Power: An Exposé of the Secret Afrikaner Broederbond (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978), 34, 35, 135-36, 251; Ivor Wilkins and Hans Strydom, The Broederbond (New York: Paddington Press, 1979), 47; Herman Giliomee, "The National Party and the Afrikaner Broederbond" in The Apartheid Regime, ed. Rober H. Price and Carl Rosberg (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley; Berkeley Research Series, no. 43, 1980), 39; O’Meara, 51, 60-66, 74, 102; Welsh, "White Supremacy," 61, 66-67; Harrison, 60, 90-91, 94, 95, 200; Thompson, 46ff.

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16. Quote: Moodie, 96. Marshall, 177: "The agreed aim of the Statute of Westminster was to remove the ties of the Colonial Laws Validity Act, and the subordination of the Dominions as communities to the United Kingdom and to the sovereignty of the Imperial Parliament." Moodie, 39, 40, 46; de Villiers, 390-92; Lipton, 277; Stultz 152; Thompson, 38; O’Meara, 39-40, 49.

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17. First quote: de Villiers, 370. Second quote: O’Meara, 44. Statistics: Newell M. Stultz, Afrikaner Politics in South Africa, 1934-1948 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974), 58, 88, 152; cf. Lipton, 277. For the 1948 elections an alliance was formed with the small Afrikaner Party. In 1940 the GNP changed its name to Herenigde Nasionale party of Volksparty (Reunited National Party or People’s Party), not to be confused with the Albert Hertzog’s 1969 split-off from the NP, the Herstigte Nasionale party (Reconstituted National Party). The name was shortened to Nasionale party in 1951 when the Afrikaner Party was absorbed.

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18. First quote: Thompson, 180. Second quote: Moodie, 180. Dec. 16 is a volk holiday that used to be called Dingaan’s Day, after the defeated Zulu chief. The name was changed to Day of the Covenant (Geloftedag) in 1952, and to Day of the Vow in 1980. Stultz, 61n; Thompson, 39f, chap 5, esp. 183-188; Harrison, chap. 8; Moodie, chap. 9, 178, 184; Wilkins and Strydom, 7-107; O’Meara, 76. Cf. Wilkins and Strydom, 97, 106.

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19. First quote: O’Meara, 77. Second quote: Moodie, 21. On the state of popular consciousness see also O’Meara, 74, 76-77. Giliomee’s responses to Moodie are in his "Identity," 113-14 and his "Party and Broederbond," 17-18. Cf. Lipton, 269, 277-8.

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20. Moodie, 199; Lipton, 269. According to Danziger, 287 (published in 1971), the Volkskongres was "the most significant historical event which marked the reconstruction of the Afrikaner elite in its present form."

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21. Moodie, 233; O’Meara, 77.

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22. Quote: Stultz, 5. Giliomee, "Identity," 114; Marshall, 40; Krüger, 196-8; Stultz, 61, 25.

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23. Quote: Moodie, 216. Moodie, 209-10, 235. For a discussion of National Socialist and Fascist ideologies, see A. James. Gregor "National Socialism," "Fascism and Fascisms," "Apartheid," and "Political Thought in the Twentieth Century" all chaps. in his Contemporary Radical Ideologies: Totalitarian Thought in the Twentieth Century (New York: Random House, 1968), and A. James Gregor, The Ideology of Fascism: The Rationale of Totalitarianism (New York: Free Press/London: Collier-Macmillan, 1969), xiii-xiv, 245, (and passim) as well as his various other works on the same topic.

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24. Stultz, 142-47. Lipton, 282; According to "South Africa’s Violent Rage," Maclean’s Canada (Toronto), 18 Sept. 1989, 35, the NP received one million votes, the CP 600,000, and the new Democratic Party, 450,000; Christopher Wren, "Governing Party Suffers Setback in Pretoria Vote" and Robert Pear, "National Party: Afrikaner Instrument of Power for 4 Decades," both in New York Times, 7 Sept. 1989 (page numbers are not given for this newspaper as there are several regional editions).

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25. Stultz, 152; Lipton, 277.

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26. First Quote: Lipton, 277-78 (cf. Moodie, 237-38). Second quote: Lipton, 278. Lipton, 280, 282; cf. Stultz 152.

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27. Giliomee, "Beginnings," 41, 46, 48. Abraham Kuyper, Lectures on Calvinism (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1931), 30, 53, 121ff, 129; O’Meara, 69, 70, 102; Moodie, 54-55, 65; de Klerk, 204. For some criticisms of O’Meara see pp. 89-96 of Hermann Giliomee, "Constructing Afrikaner Nationalism," and pp. 109-12 of Hamish F. Dickie-Clark, "Ideology in Recent Writings on South Africa," both in South Africa: The Limits of Reform Politics, ed. Heribert Adam (Leiden, Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1983). For the influence of Kuyperianism in the 19th century Boer republics see Norman, 112-113.

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28. Moodie, 154ff, 299; de Klerk, 204, 215-221; Thompson, 42-44. Johan C. Fick, "Afrikaner Student Politics--Past and Present," in Student Perspectives on South Africa, ed. Hendrik W. van der Merwe and David Welsh (Cape Town: David Philip, 1972), 65-67. Hermann Giliomee, "Apartheid, Verligtheid, and Liberalism," in Democratic Liberalism in South Africa: Its History and Prospect, ed. Jeffrey Butler, Richard Elphick, and David Welsh (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press/Cape Town: David Philip, 1987), 366.

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29. Quote: Gregor, "Apartheid," 204 (clarification in brackets added) (cf. Thompson, 43). Gregor, "Apartheid," 236-56; De Klerk, 204-206.

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30. Moodie, 270, 160; Kuyper, 79ff, 94ff. O’Meara, 69, 70-72, 81.

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31. Moodie, 244n. Cf. F. van Zyl Slabbert, "The Dynamics of Reform and Revolt in Current South Africa, " in The Tanner Lectures on Human Values: X, 1988, ed. Grethe B. Peterson (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press/Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 211.

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32. First quote: de Klerk, 220. Second quote: Gregor, "Apartheid," 235. On the development of the ideology of apartheid, see Gregor, "Apartheid," 233-36. Hermann Giliomee, "Afrikaner Politics: How the System Works" in Adam and Giliomee, Ethnic Power Mobilized, 240; de Villiers, 370ff; Serfontein, 162-63; Stanley B. Greenberg, Legitimating the Illegitimate: State, Markets, and Resistance in South Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987), 128.

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33. Lipton’s definition of apartheid is on Lipton, 14-16. O’Meara, 65.

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34. Thompson, 46-54; Gregor, "Apartheid," 266-268; A. James Gregor, The Fascist Persuasion in Radical Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974); Welsh, "White Supremacy," 64; Pieter Le Roux, "Growing Up an Afrikaner," 204. On education see Harrison, ch. 16; David Welsh, "Some Political and Social Determinants of the Academic Environment," in ed. van der Merwe and Welsh, 13-14, 21. On ethnicist institutionalization see F. van Zyl Slabbert, "Afrikaner Nationalism, White Politics, and Political Change in South Africa" in Change in Contemporary South Africa, ed. Thompson and Butler. On the South African Broadcasting Corporation see Kitt Katzin, "PW Revealed as Would-Be TV Dictator," Weekly Star, 14 June 1989, 1; Thompson, 47-48.

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35. First quote: Danziger, 287. Second quote: de Villiers, 394. Compare South Africa’s severance from Britain with the Angevin loss of Normandy in A. D. 1204 in the development of a specifically English identity among the aristocracy; R. C. Van Caenegem, The Birth of the English Common Law, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 97-98. Hermann Giliomee, "The Development of the Afrikaner’s Self-Concept" in South Africa: Sociological Analyses, ed. Paul A. Hare, Gerd Wiendieck, and Max H. von Broembsen (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1979), 61. Johan Degenaar, "Nationalism, Liberalism, and Pluralism" in ed. Butler, Elphick, and Welsh, 238; Butler, 82, 94, 98, 100.

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36. Quote: Lipton, 292. Steve Biko, "White Racism and Black Consciousness," in ed. van der Merwe and Welsh, 196-7; Greenberg, 83; Thompson, 40; Giliomee, "Self-Concept," 61. Jeffrey Butler, "The Significance of Recent Changes within the White Ruling Caste," in Change in Contemporary South Africa, ed. Thompson and Butler, 100. According to Welsh, "White Supremacy," 75, "the cleavage within the oligarchy was the more immediate issue in White politics until the 1950s when, under pressure of hostile international opinion and the rise of African nationalism, it was eclipsed by the race issue." According to Giliomee, "Self-Concept," 58: "In the years since 1948 much of the zeal formerly expended on formulations of Afrikaner identity, to distinguish it from that of the English, has been channeled into attempts to define the position of the Whites in relation to the non-Whites and to incorporate such distinctions in government policy." Kurt Danziger, "Modernization and the Legitimation of Social Power," in South Africa, ed. Adam, 297: "At least since 1961 the primary focus of official attempts at legitimating the existing system has been in terms of loyalty to the State rather that in terms of loyalty to the ideals of Afrikaner cultural exclusiveness."

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37. Welsh, "White Supremacy," 73. Welsh, "White Supremacy," 76; Welsh, "Academic Environment," 38.

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38. Lipton, 320. A decade later Botha thought that Afrikaners could do with a bit more unity (John D. Battersby, "Botha Urges Unity for Afrikaners on 10th Anniversary as President," New York Times, 29 Sept. 1988). See also P. W. Botha, "President Botha Talks about his Ten Years as Head of State," interviewed by Alf Ries, Focus on South Africa, Oct. 1988, 3 (taken from Die Burger [Cape Town]).

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39. Max Weber, "Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen: Einleitung," in Gesammelte Afsätze zur Religionssoziologie, vol. 1 (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1920/1988), 248 (my translation). An English translation of this essay is available as "The Social Psychology of the World Religions," chap. in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, trans., ed., and intro. Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946); the corresponding pages are 276-77.

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40. Giliomee, "The Afrikaner Economic Advance," in Adam and Giliomee, Ethnic Power Mobilized, 173.

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41. Slabbert, 12; Welsh, "Academic Environment," 22; Adam, 172-73 Michiel Le Roux, "The New Afrikaners: Views on the Ideals and Policies of the Moderate Afrikaans Students," in ed. van der Merwe and Welsh, 86; see also Pieter Le Roux, 191.

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42. Michiel Roux, "The New Afrikaners: Views on the Ideals and Policies of the Moderate Afrikaans Students," in ed. van der Merwe and Welsh, 86; see also Pieter Le Roux, 191.

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43. David Braun, "No Hope for United Great Trek Festival," Weekly Star, 24 Nov. 1987, 6; Christopher Wren, "Pretoria’s White Tribe is Split on its Sacred Day," New York Times, 18 Dec. 1988. For an earlier year, see Alan Cowell, "Rival Observances in a Divided South Africa," New York Times, 17 Dec. 1986.

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44. On mindsets see Donald Rosdil, "Cultural and Economic Origins of Progressive Reform: The Case of Burlington, Vermont" (Paper delivered at the 1989 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia).

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45. Quote: Giliomee, "Identity," 126-127. "Divisions in Afrikanerdom: Businessmen and Intellectuals Urge Reform," South Africa Foundation News (Johannesburg), Feb. 1985, 1; Greenberg, 145-46, 149, 151. David Breier, "Follow My Leader!" and John MacLennan, "The ‘Third Great Trek’ Tries to Accommodate All," Weekly Star, 1 Nov. 1986, 15; Johan Heyns, "Johan Heyns and the NGK’s Change of Heart," interviewed by Martin Schneider, Leadership South Africa, 1986, [vol. 5,] no 5, 46-50; John D. Battersby, "Afrikaner Church Leader Presses Pretoria on Rebels," New York Times, 2 Mar. 1989. See also Colleen Ryan, "A Miracle in the NGK: The Largest Afrikaans Church Agreed to Frank Discussions with the Black Dutch Reformed Churches," Focus on South Africa, July/Aug. 1988, 5 (from the Sunday Star ). John D. Battersby, "Main White Church In South Africa Says Apartheid is Sinful," New York Times, 11 Mar. 1989; John D. Battersby, "Backing Away, White Church In South Africa Qualifies Its Stand Against Apartheid," New York Times, 16 Mar. 1989. See also "Theologians’ Plea to Leaders: Church Pressured on Apartheid," Focus on South Africa, [taken from 23 May and 1 June Die Burger (Cape Town)] June 1989, 5; 80% of South Africa’s members of parliament are members of this church.

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46. The idea became policy after Verwoerd announced it to his cabinet in 1959 (Welsh, "White Supremacy," 68-69). Homelands were never envisaged for the Coloureds and the Indians, which explains, in part, why they and not the Africans were brought into the government in 1984. The separate development ideology was anticipated in the 1946 writings of poet-intellectual N. P. van Wyk Louw (Giliomee, "Verligtheid," 367-69).

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47. M. W. M. Eiselen, professor of anthropology and one of the main architects of a plausible separate development policy, explained in an interview in the late 1970s some of the difficulties that had been experienced in the attempt to implement his policy: "You can’t imagine the bitterness of our internal political struggles. The opposition criticizes us when we put into practice what they demand in theory, that is to say, when we improve the lot of the Bantu. The farmers lose sight of our aim, they do not think ahead. When the state purchases land for the Bantu they say: Perhaps it is my farm they are going to buy tomorrow. Our people . . . only think of their daily comfort. They accept the theory. But at the same time they want comfort. Obviously a generous theory and unchallenged comfort are incompatible" (Moodie, 274).

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48. On the public sector bureaucracy, see Shula Marks and Stanley Trapido, "South Africa since 1976: An Historical Perspective," in South Africa: No Turning Back, ed. Shaun Johnson (Macmillan: Houndmills, Basingstoke, England, 1988), 7.

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49. Giliomee, "Verligtheid," 372; see ibid., 371-75 for a number of structural causes of change in South Africa since 1960.

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50. On the increase in black education see Marks and Trapido, 22, 33.

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51. On the distinctions between sanctions, divestment, and disinvestment, see van Zyl Slabbert, "The Dynamics of Reform and Revolt in Current South Africa," 260.

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52. Van Zyl Slabbert, "The Dynamics of Reform and Revolt in Current South Africa, " 217-18, 224; "Total Onslaught Idea Is Dead--Slabbert," Weekly Star, 21 June 1989, 11.

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53. "New Voices in the Land: Afrikaner Dissent," Financial Mail (Johannesburg), 1 Nov. 1985, 36-38; David Breier, "The Real Rebellion at Last?" Weekly Star, 7 March 1988, 7; Sampie Terreblanche, "A New Government," Leadership South Africa, 1987, [vol. 6,] no. 2, 18-23; Jane Perlez, "Stellenbosch Journal: At a Afrikaner Campus, Anti-Apartheid Cause Takes Root," New York Times, 20 June 1989; Christoper Wren, "Johannesburg Journal: Apartheid Splits Afrikaner Brothers," New York Times, 23 Mar. 1989; John Battersby, " Afrikaner Paper Asks Talks with Mandela Rebel Group," New York Times, 17 Jan. 1989; Mike de Vries, "Stellenbosch University Rector on the Future," interview in Focus South Africa, June 1989, 5 (translated from Die Burger, 17 May 1989); John Dugard, "Human Rights and the Rule of Law," in ed. Butler, Elphick, and Welsh.

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54. See Giliomee, "Party and Broederbond," 33, 39.

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55. Lipton, 318-19. In the 1977 elections 30 percent of the English speakers voted for the NP (Giliomee, "Party and Broederbond," 32). On the class significance of the Herzogite split of 1969, see Adam, 172-73.

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56. Lipton, 319, 356n; Thompson, 41, 255-56. See ibid., 212 on the demise of the Slagter’s Nek story.

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57. Lipton, 318-19.

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58. See Peter Fabricius, "CP Promises to Keep Policy on ‘Homelands,’" Weekly Star, 2 Aug. 1989, 8. For more extreme ethnicists see David Beresford, "Right-wing group is banned," Manchester Guardian Weekly, 27 Nov. 1988, 8; Patrick Laurence, "TerreBlanche May Be on OB Path to Extinction," Weekly Star, 28 June 1989, 11.

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59. Stanley Uys, "The Afrikaner Establishment," in South Africa, ed. Marks and Trapido, 212-13.

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60. "1989 General Election Full Results" (and other articles in the same issue), Weekly Star, 20 Sept. 1989; Esmaré van der Merwe, "Rightwing Whites are Forming Armed Units," Weekly Star, 11 April 1990, 8; Michael Shafto (interviewing Denis Beckett), "Now We’ve Got ‘Boere-Guilt,’ Says Beckett," Weekly Star, 21 March 1990, 11; David Breier and John MacLennan, "A Stunning Victory for All: Government and African National Congress Take First Step toward Peace," Weekly Star, 9 May 1990, 12-13; Christopher S. Wren, "Paper is Bombed in Johannesburg: Damage is Slight at Office of an Afrikaans Weekly that Reported Rightist Plot," New York Times, 5 July 1990.

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